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ABSTRACT: This paper compares Cassirer’s and Bohr’s views on symbolic knowledge in quantum physics.  Although 
both of them consider quantum physics as symbolic knowledge, for Cassirer this amounts to a complete 
renunciation to intuition in quantum physics, while according to Bohr only spatio-temporal images may 
provide the mathematical formalism of the theory with physical reference. We show the Kantian roots of 
Bohr’s position and we claim that his Kantian concept of symbol enables Bohr to account for the sensible 
content of quantum theory as well as for its systematic relation to classical physics.    
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RESUMEN: En este artículo se comparan las concepciones de Cassirer y Bohr del conocimiento simbólico de la física 
cuántica. Aunque ambos consideran a la física cuántica un conocimiento simbólico, para Cassirer esto   
conlleva una renuncia total a la intuición en física cuántica, mientras que para Bohr sólo las imágenes      
espacio-temporales pueden proporcionar al formalismo matemático de la teoría una referencia física.    
Mostraremos las raíces kantianas de la posición de Bohr y afirmaremos que esta noción kantiana de      
símbolo permite a Bohr explicar el contenido sensible de la teoría cuántica, así como su relación sistemática 
con la física clásica. 
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In this paper I aim at comparing the epistemological function which Cassirer assigns 
to sensible intuition in quantum physics with that assigned by Bohr. I shall show that 
both agree on the impossibility of considering sensible representations as direct exhibi-
tions in intuition of atomic objects and processes. In this sense, both consider our 
knowledge of the quantum realm to be symbolic. However, while for Cassirer this en-
tails that spatio-temporal images play no substantial role in quantum physics, Bohr 
maintains that these images provide the mathematical formalism of the theory with 
reference to the physical world. Instead of celebrating an alleged abandonment of sen-
sible representations, as Cassirer does, Bohr claims that spatio-temporal pictures 
should be retained in order to exhibit quantum objects and processes indirectly in intui-
tion. In this way, while Cassirer states that it is only by completely renouncing sensible 
representations in quantum physics that we may gain systematicity in our physical 
knowledge, Bohr is able to account for the sensible content of quantum theory as well 
as for its systematic relation to classical physics.    
 
                                                      
* This article is part of the proyect FONDECYT N°1140112, Government of Chile. 
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 In the following, I first reconstruct Cassirer’s view on the role of sensible intuition 
in modern science. Then, I turn to Bohr’s account of the epistemological function of 
classical pictures in quantum physics. Finally, I consider the problem of the systematic 
relationship between our knowledge of the classical and the quantum realm. 
1. Cassirer on Intuitive and Symbolic Knowledge in Modern Science 
Cassirer (1956, 130f) conceives the novel epistemological issues raised by quantum 
physics as following the general tendency already shown by the development of    
classical physics. The knowledge of nature provided by modern science is determined 
by the progressive abandonment of the concept of substance in favour of the concept 
of function. This process leads us to refrain from any claimed similarity between   
concepts and things. Whereas in the substantialistic conception one presupposes “the 
existence of things in their inexhaustible multiplicity, and the power of the mind to  
select from this wealth of particular existences those features that are common to  
several of them” (1923, 4), according to the functionalistic view objects are no longer 
the starting point but rather the end goal of our considerations. Our knowledge of  
nature progresses by condensing into laws and thus into objective statements the em-
pirical data gained through observations and measurements: “Objectivity, or objective 
reality, is attained only because and insofar as there is conformity to law—not vice 
versa” (1956, 132). It is precisely by rejecting any similarity between concepts and 
things that modern science is able to become aware of the “lawfulness of being and 
events” (1957, vol. 3, 452). This means that modern science becomes “truly systematic 
only by resolving to become symbolic in the strict sense” (ibid.). 
 It is not our aim to carry out here a general discussion on Cassirer’s concept of 
symbol.1 We would like to point out just one particular aspect of Cassirer’s position, 
namely that symbolic knowledge is to be opposed with intuitive knowledge. By maintain-
ing this opposition, the Neo-Kantian Cassirer moves away from the Kantian doctrine 
and approaches a Neo-Leibnizian stance.2 Let us briefly consider this issue.3 
 In a very well-known passage, Leibniz explicitly establishes the opposition between 
symbolic and intuitive knowledge. Leibniz claims: “All knowledge is either obscure or 
clear, and clear knowledge is either confused or distinct; the distinct in its turn is either 
inadequate or adequate, and again symbolic or intuitive” (1985, 3).4 
 Kant firmly rejects this view and affirms that “the intuitive in cognition must be 
contrasted to the discursive (not to the symbolic)” (2000, 226 [KU, AA V, 352]).  
Symbolic knowledge is rather a kind of intuitive cognition, which takes place when a 
concept is exhibited in intuition in a mediate manner, by means of an analogy. If, on 
                                                      
1 On this issue see Ferrari (2003). 
2 This point is underlined by Ferrari in his 2003, 163ff. 
3
 On the Leibnizian and Kantian traditions in the modern history of the concept of symbol, see           
Ferrari (2002). 
4 See also Wolff (1720, §§ 316 –324). On Leibniz’s concept of symbol see Krämer (1991; 1992). 
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the contrary, a concept is immediately exhibited in intuition, this intuitive representa-
tion is not symbolic but schematic.  
 As we said, with his doctrine of symbolic knowledge Cassirer gets closer to Leibniz 
than to Kant. However, a crucial difference should be indicated. According to Leibniz, 
the most perfect knowledge is not symbolic knowledge, but the one which is “both 
adequate and intuitive” (1985, 3). Leibniz considers as most perfect the knowledge 
provided by an intellectual intuition which enables us to simultaneously conceive the 
manifold of concepts present in a composite one. To the contrary, Cassirer favours 
symbolic over intuitive cognition, for the latter is now provided by a sensible intuition, 
dependent on space, time and empirical determinations.  
 Cassirer claims that the development of modern natural philosophy may be charac-
terized as a progressive transition from intuitive to symbolic knowledge.  The first 
milestone on this road is Descartes. According to Cassirer, Descartes substituted with 
pure representations those elements present in Aristotelian physics that were related 
to sensation. Thereby Descartes conceived a true understanding of nature as depend-
ing on the condition that we represent the material fullness and diversity of nature “by 
a diversity of form, a geometrical schematism” (1957, vol. 3, 455). The key to a true 
insight into the lawfulness of nature is not to be found in sensation but in pure space. 
 But, for Cassirer, this Cartesian position was soon overcome by Leibniz. The form 
on which physical knowledge is ultimately grounded is not spatial but logical. If we are 
to obtain true knowledge of nature, then not only the sensuous must be disregarded:  
intuitive images, even non-empirical ones, must be dismissed altogether.5 The most 
basic propositions about reality are rather grounded on mere intellectual truths.  
 By emancipating our knowledge from sensible intuition, Leibniz paves the way to a 
universal cognition of nature. But the history of philosophy followed another path. 
Kant does not renounce to sensible intuition. On the contrary, he emphatically      
criticizes Leibniz for having “intellectualized the appearances” by failing to realize that 
sensible intuitions are not merely obscure and confuse representations that the       
understanding may make clear and distinct. Sensibility is rather a “special source of 
representations,” as original as understanding, with which the latter must cooperate in or-
der to “judge about things with objective validity” (1998, 372 [A271/B327]).       
However, Cassirer questions this Kantian vindication of sensible knowledge.6 With 
the introduction of Kant´s concept of pure intuition, Cassirer maintains, “a peculiar 
reversal in the progress of philosophical principles” (1957, vol. 3, 458; my italics) took 
place.   
 According to Cassirer, Kant develops his doctrine of sensibility as a moment of the 
foundation of Newtonian mechanics. Such foundation is carried out following what 
Neo-Kantians call the transcendental method.7 This method consists in taking a fact as 
                                                      
5 “A true theory of nature [...] could be achieved only if we learned to disregard both barriers, the sensu-
ous as well as the intuitive” (1957, vol. 3, 456). 
6 On this issue, see Friedman (2000, 108ff).  
7 It is worth noting that the expression ‘transcendental method’ is not to be found in Kant’s texts.        
See Baum (1980). 
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point of departure of the philosophical investigation, which searches for the condi-
tions of the possibility of that fact. In this case, Euclidean geometry and Newtonian 
physics are the assumed facts. However, if these facts are modified, so are their condi-
tions of possibility. Transcendental philosophy faces precisely such situation with the 
discovery of non-Euclidean geometry and the birth of the theory of relativity. Regard-
ing the former, Cassirer states: 
 Here [in Kant], then, “pure sensibility” has acquired a position in the total structure of mathemat-
ics very different from that which it occupied for Leibniz. Sensibility has ceased to be a mere 
means of representation, as in Leibniz, and has become an independent ground of knowledge: in-
tuition has now achieved a grounding, legitimizing value. For Leibniz the sphere of intuitive 
knowledge, referring to the objective combination of ideas, is separate from the sphere of sym-
bolic knowledge, in which we have to do not with the ideas themselves but with the signs that 
represent them: but the intuition to which he goes back does not stand in opposition to the logi-
cal; rather it comprises both the logical and the mathematical as special forms. For Kant, howev-
er, the dividing line does not pass between intuitive and symbolic thinking, but rather between 
the discursive concept and “pure intuition,” and the meaning of mathematics can only be provid-
ed by, and grounded in, the latter. 
 In this methodological divergence it seems clear that modern mathematics has followed the 
road indicated by Leibniz rather than that suggested by Kant. This has followed particularly from 
the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry. The new problems growing out of this discovery have 
turned mathematics more and more into a hypothetical-deductive system, whose truth-value is 
grounded purely in its inner logical coherence and consistency, and not in any material, intuitive 
statements. (1957, vol. 3, 363-64) 
 Regarding the theory of general relativity, Cassirer indicates that this theory has put 
into question the logical priority which, according to the Kantian doctrine of space 
and time, these pure forms of sensibility have in respect to the matter given in them. For 
Cassirer, this calls for a thorough revision of Kant’s doctrine of sensibility: 
 The axiom that space itself and what fills it, what is substantial and real in it, are separate, that 
they may be split conceptually into two sharply divided modes of being, is taken from the system 
of classical mechanics. But with this of course Kant’s theory of pure intuition and the whole rela-
tion he sets up between the transcendental analytic and the transcendental aesthetic, runs into a 
difficulty which was bound to become apparent as soon as this axiom itself began to be ques-
tioned—as soon as the theory of classical mechanics gave way to the general theory of relativity. 
(ibid., 459)8 
 More generally, the new theories in physics show that symbolic representations 
must gradually take the place of intuitive pictures. Against the Kantian defense of the 
necessary role of sensible intuition in knowledge, Cassirer argues that “physics has de-
finitively left the realm of representation and of representability in general for a more 
abstract realm” (ibid., 467).9 
 
 
 
                                                      
8 For a recent discussion on Cassirer’s position about the problem of space, see Neuber (2012). 
9 On Cassirer’s philosophy of physics, see Gawronsky (1949), von Strauß und Torney (1956), Hübner 
(1963) and especially Schmitz-Rigal (2002). 
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 This renunciation to intuitive representations can paradigmatically be found in 
quantum theory:  
[Bohr] expressed the conviction that the general problem of the quantum theory was not con-
cerned with a modification of mechanical and electrodynamic theories that could be explained on 
the basis of ordinary physical concepts but involved a radical denial of the space-time ideas by 
means of which a description of natural phenomena had previously been attempted. Atomic 
physics cannot be constructed ‘without resignation of the wish for sensuous presentation.’    
(1950, 116) 
In view of this, Cassirer argues that we would better content ourselves with the math-
ematical formulation of the laws of the theory and refrain from any exhibition of them 
in intuition: “The more the conceptual determination progresses, the less it proves 
possible to fix its results in simple particular visual images. We have to be satisfied 
with determination by means of laws and must forego any clarification through mod-
els” (1956, 144). 
 Moreover, Cassirer claims that this renunciation of intuitiveness does not amount 
to a renunciation of objectivity in our physical knowledge, because, as we have seen, 
this objectivity is guaranteed by the mere lawlikeness of the theory: “But true physical 
objectivity is here not diminished but increased, for it must never be sought in the di-
rection of ‘naive’ things, but rather in the direction of critical laws” (ibid.).10 
 In the following section we shall come back to Bohr’s view, according to which 
quantum physics does not provide us with spatio-temporal images of natural objects 
and processes. However, we shall see that, precisely for this reason and in contradic-
tion to Cassirer, Bohr maintains that the physical reference of quantum theory de-
pends on classical descriptions of measurements results, which do provide us with spa-
tio-temporal images.  
2. Bohr on Intuitive and Symbolic Knowledge in Quantum Theory 
Just as Cassirer, Bohr considers physical knowledge to be symbolic. But we should 
distinguish two senses in which this symbolic character of physics is understood by 
Bohr. In the first place, science in general and physics in particular provide us with 
symbolic knowledge because scientific concepts do not portray or depict reality. Their 
function is rather to bring about order among appearances, connecting them in a uni-
                                                      
10 According to Cassirer, the lawlikeness of physical knowledge gets specified in three different types of 
statements: the statements of measurement results, the statements of laws and the statements of principles. 
These statements are arranged into a system of experience invariants, being the principle of causality 
the ultimate condition upon which such system rests (1956, 29 ff).  An analysis of this issue is carried 
out in Pringe (2014). In 1910 Cassirer maintains that “the critical theory of experience would consti-
tute the universal invariant theory of experience” (1923, 268). In 1936 Cassirer states that the development 
of modern physics has done nothing but confirm this view (1956, xxiii). He affirms that the role of 
invariants in physics, which he established in 1910 only by means of his analysis of classical physics, 
corresponds to “the program of modern theoretical physics, as presented for instance by P. A. Dirac 
in his Principles of Quantum Mechanics” (1956, 138). Also the theory of relativity confirms those early re-
sults of a critical theory of experience (1923, 379). For an analysis of Cassirer´s interpretation of rela-
tivity theory, see Ryckman (2005). 
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fied experience as extended and interconnected as possible.11 The purpose of science 
“is not to disclose the real essence of the phenomena but only to track down, so far as 
it is possible, relations between the manifold aspects of experience” (1934, 18). This is 
particularly the case of physics. Physics does not study “something a priori given,” 
since physics is just a method “for ordering and surveying human experience” (1963, 
10). Quantum and classical physics are symbolic in this sense.  
 At this point, Bohr would agree with Cassirer, who states that scientific concepts 
“are valid, not in that they copy a fixed given being, but in so far as they contain a plan 
for possible constructions of unity, which must be progressively verified in practice, in 
application to the empirical material” (1923, 322).  
 In fact, Kramers recalls that “Bohr has expressed himself in discussions somewhat 
as follows: classical physics and the quantum theory, taken as descriptions of nature, 
are both caricatures” (quoted in Honner 1987, 158). The objective validity of science 
does not depend on the existence of a reality to be copied by our concepts, but rather 
on the “objective determinateness of the method of experience” (1923, 322). Bohr would 
have subscribed to this view.  
 However, there is a second sense in which physics may be considered symbolic 
knowledge, but this meaning applies only to quantum and not to classical physics. 
Moreover, in this case Bohr’s concept of symbol differs from Cassirer’s, because sym-
bolic knowledge is not to be opposed with intuitive cognition. In this second sense, 
symbolic knowledge is the cognition of what cannot be directly exhibited in intuition. 
Since atomic objects and processes cannot simultaneously satisfy the demands of spa-
tio-temporal coordination and the claim of causality, atomic objects and processes 
cannot be directly exhibited in intuition and their knowledge is thus symbolic. Classi-
cal physics is not symbolic knowledge in this restricted sense.  
 In this connection, an epistolary exchange between Bohr and Christian Møller is 
particularly relevant. Møller asks Bohr explicitly about the meaning of the word   
‘symbolic’:  
The question at stake is what one really understands under the word ‘symbolic’—what does it 
mean that, e.g., the representation of a free particle by means of de Broglie waves is only a    
symbolic representation?” (Møller to Bohr, 10.06.28; quoted in Stolzenburg 1977, 244; my   
translation) 
 But even more important to our discussion is that Møller, after acknowledging that 
all the signs we use to describe nature are symbols, poses the crucial question: 
What does it mean that some [signs] are more symbolic than others [?] (Møller to Bohr, 10.06.28; 
quoted in Stolzenburg 1977, 244; my italics and translation) 
In other words, he demands for an explanation of the specific symbolic character of 
quantum theory, that distinguishes it from classical physics.  
 In his response, Bohr agrees that both classical and quantum physics make use of 
symbols. However, he maintains that there is a difference between both symbolisms 
and that this difference lies in their relation to intuition: 
                                                      
11 “The task of science is both to extend the range of our experience and to reduce it to order” Bohr 
(1934, 1). 
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I have only tried to underline the fact that in quantum theory we extensively use the same     
symbols as in classical theory, what nevertheless does not allow us to overlook the big difference 
between these theories and makes necessary great caution in the application of the forms of      
intuition to which the classical symbols are linked.12 
 The quantum-mechanical formalism is symbolic because its concepts cannot be 
represented directly in intuition. This is so even in the case of the wave formalism, 
where the intuitive elements of the theory may hide the specific symbolic character 
that distinguishes it from any classical theory:   
 If one considers the wave theory, its ‘intuitiveness’ is, however, precisely its strength and its trap 
at the same time and, by underlying the symbolic character of the approach, I have tried to point 
out here the great difference from the classical  theories due to the quantum postulate, [a differ-
ence] that is not always taken sufficiently into account. (ibid.) 
 In the case of matrix mechanics, to the contrary, there is no doubt about the strict 
symbolic character of the formalism:   
Of course, it is not so easy to run into this danger in the matrix formulation, where rules that   
differ so much from our usual algebra always make evident to us the peculiar essence of quantum 
theory; to use the word ‘symbolic’ for non-commutative algebra is by the way a language usage 
that goes back much further than quantum theory and it is incorporated in the general mathemat-
ical terminology. (ibid.) 
 As a matter of fact, Bohr underlines the peculiar symbolic character of quantum 
physics by putting quantum symbols in opposition to classical concepts. The latter can be 
exhibited in spatio-temporal pictures, while the former cannot.13 
 But this sharp distinction between classical and quantum physics is followed by a 
positive determination of their relationship: classical concepts symbolize atomic      
objects and processes. More concretely, it is by means of the concepts of isolated   
particle and free radiation that we exhibit quantum processes indirectly in intuition.14 
These concepts are classical, since “such concepts as corpuscle and wave are only well 
defined within the scope of classical physics, where, of course, light and electrons are 
electromagnetic waves and material corpuscles respectively” (1932, 48). For this     
reason, “phrases such as ‘the corpuscular nature of light’ or ‘the wave nature of     
electrons’ are ambiguous” (ibid.). This means that we are thereby not claiming that, 
e.g., electrons are waves, but just that they behave as if they were waves.15 We establish a 
                                                      
12 Bohr to Møller, 14.06.28 (quoted in Stolzenburg 1977, 245–46; my translation). Even though the 
‘old quantum theory’ should be distinguished from ‘quantum mechanics’, Bohr still uses the expres-
sion ‘quantum theory’ after the establishment of quantum mechanics, as it is clear in this passage. For 
Bohr, wave and matrix mechanics are just two different formulations of the same (quantum) theory. 
13 This is particularly stressed by Chevalley in her (1994, 35ff). 
14 “Hitherto we have only regarded certain general features of the quantum problema. This situation im-
plies, however, that the main stress has to be laid on the formulation of the laws governing the inter-
action between the objects which we symbolize by the abstractions of isolated particles and radia-
tion” Bohr (1934, 69). See Pringe (2008). 
15 “The extreme fertility of wave pictures in accounting for the behaviour of electrons must, however, not 
make us forget that there is no question of a complete analogy with ordinary wave propagation in 
material media or with non-substantial energy transmission in electromagnetic waves. Just as in the 
case of radiation quanta, often called ‘photons’, we have here to do with symbols helpful in the    
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certain analogy between the behaviour of atomic objects and classical objects, which 
enables us to obtain an intuitive albeit indirect representation of the atomic entities.  
 In order to thoroughly account for the empirical evidence it is necessary to use in-
compatible classical images to represent atomic objects. For example, electrons behave 
in some situations as if they were waves, but in some others as if they were corpuscles. 
These incompatible images, each of which is indispensable for a complete account of 
the experiments, are called complementary representations. The extension and limits of 
their valid use is determined by the uncertainty relations set up by Heisenberg. Bohr 
considers these relations “as a direct expression of the absolute limitation of the ap-
plicability of visualizable conceptions in the description of nature” (1934, 114). Their 
specific task “consists in assuring quantitatively the logical compatibility of apparently con-
tradictory laws which appear when we use two different experimental arrangements” 
(1937, 293).  
 Heisenberg summarizes the situation as follows: 
[F]or visualization [of atomic processes] […] we must content ourselves with two incomplete 
analogies—the wave picture and the corpuscular picture. The simultaneous applicability of both 
pictures is thus a natural criterion to determine how far each analogy may be ‘pushed’ and forms 
an obvious starting-point for the critique of the concepts which have entered atomic theories in 
the course of their development, for, obviously, uncritical deduction of consequences from both 
will lead to contradictions. In this way one obtains the limitations of the concept of a particle by 
considering the concept of a wave. As N. Bohr has shown, this is the basis of a very simple     
derivation of the uncertainty relations between co-ordinate and momentum of a particle. In the 
same manner one may derive the limitations of the concept of a wave by comparison with the 
concept of a particle. (1949, 11)16 
 Briefly, quantum and classical physics provide us with symbolic knowledge because 
none of them is meant to copy an absolute reality. Their task as scientific theories is 
rather, using a Kantian expression, to “spell out appearances, so that they can be read 
as experience” (2002, 105–06 [Prol., AA 4: 312]). But the way in which this task is   
carried out by each of them is not the same. In classical physics, it is possible to      
exhibit concepts directly in intuition in order to gain a single and all-encompassing  
image of nature. To the contrary, in quantum physics, such a single image cannot be 
obtained. Complementary images should be used so that atomic objects and processes 
are indirectly exhibited in intuition. This is the specific symbolic character of quantum 
physics Møller was asking about. 
3. Cassirer’s versus Bohr’s Symbolism 
Both Cassirer and Bohr stress that quantum concepts cannot be exhibited in intuition 
in the way classical concepts are. However, while for Cassirer this is nothing but a 
paradigmatic example of the general tendency of science that progressively gets free 
from the constraints of sensible intuition, Bohr considers that the impossibility of    
direct exhibition in intuition sets a crucial problem to any interpretation of quantum 
                                                                                                                                         
formulation of the probability laws governing the occurrence of the elementary processes which can-
not be further analysed in terms of classical physical ideas” (1932, 48). 
16 See Heisenberg (1949, 11). 
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physics. The point of view of complementarity aims at guaranteeing the sensible con-
tent of atomic theory, given the restrictions on intuitive exhibition implied by the 
quantum postulate. Neither the wave nor the corpuscular theory may receive a direct 
exhibition in intuition: atomic objects are neither waves nor particles. However, in or-
der to account for the experimental evidence, these complementary images must be 
used as symbolic representations of atomic objects. Atomic objects behave in certain 
situations as if they were waves and in other experimental contexts as if they were parti-
cles.17 Whereas according to Cassirer quantum physics is symbolic knowledge because 
intuitive images have lost their cognitive value in the atomic realm, Bohr does not re-
ject such value. Rather, these intuitive images enable atomic objects to be indirectly 
exhibited in intuition. For Bohr, the symbolic knowledge provided by quantum phys-
ics is not to be opposed to but is a kind of intuitive knowledge. In this sense, we may 
determine Cassirer´s and Bohr´s respective place in the modern history of the concept 
of symbol: while the neo-Kantian Cassirer puts forward a neo-Leibnizian concept of 
symbol, Bohr is closer to the Kantian than to the Leibnizian stance.18  
 A further point concerns the relationship between intuitiveness and unification in 
physical theories. Cassirer maintains that in modern physics “the schematism of imag-
es has given way to the symbolism of principles” (1957, vol. 3, 467). As we have al-
ready argued, for Cassirer the task of physical theories is not to represent a given reali-
ty but to articulate appearances in a unified experience. This is precisely what the de-
velopment of modern physics shows: “the tendency toward unification has triumphed 
over the tendency toward representation” (ibid.). Cassirer renounces to intuitiveness in 
order to achieve unification. To the contrary, Bohr is able to account for the unifying 
power of quantum physics without renouncing to the demand of intuitiveness.19 From 
the perspective of complementarity, quantum physics brings about systematic unity 
among incompatible classical pictures, whereas these classical representations, albeit 
                                                      
17 In a letter to Bohr, Schrödinger protests against such a view: “One may weaken the statements, by say-
ing, e.g., that the collection of atoms ‘in certain respects behaves as if …’ and ‘in certain respects so 
as if …’, but this is so to speak merely a juridical expedient that cannot be converted into clear rea-
soning.” Schrödinger to Bohr, 23.10.26 (BCW, vol. 6, 12–3). However, from the viewpoint of com-
plementarity there is no unclear reasoning here, for the way in which the symbols are to be used is 
precisely determined by the uncertainty relations. Fine quotes this letter and identifies Vaihinger’s fic-
tionalism (Vaihinger 1924) as the source of this use of the ‘as if’ idiom. See Fine (2009, 23 and fn. 8). 
For an overview of the recent discussion on fictionalism in the philosophy of science, see Suárez 
(2009). 
18 See Pringe (2008). The Kantian roots of the Bohrian concept of symbol have also been stressed by 
Chevalley (see her 1994) who moreover calls the attention to the post-Kantian tradition, in which one 
may count Goethe, Humboldt, Helmholtz, Hertz and Husserl. See also Brock (2003, 136–39). Che-
valley affirms that Bohr’s use of symbolism is a kind of heresy for a Kantian, because Kant distin-
guished sharply between the world of physics and those realms ruled by symbolic presentation (art, 
teleology, language) (1995, 343). However, one may also argue for the necessity of symbolic presenta-
tions in quantum physics within the very limits of a Kantian critique of knowledge. See Pringe (2007). 
19 It should be pointed out that Bohr´s position also differs from those according to which intuitiveness 
but not unification may be achieved in physical knowledge. This is the case of, i.e., Cartwright’s 
piecemeal physics (see her 1999). In contrast to Cassirer’s and Cartwright´s positions, the viewpoint 
of complementarity enables us to have the best of both worlds: intuitiveness and unification. 
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indirectly, provide quantum physics with intuitive content. In this way, Bohr does not 
oppose unification to intuitiveness in quantum physics. He seeks for the satisfaction 
of both demands. These are fulfilled simultaneously by means of a complementary 
symbolism in the Kantian sense. 
 Moreover, it should be indicated that Cassirer’s position leaves the systematic rela-
tionship between classical and quantum physics without a satisfactory explanation. 
Classical and quantum physics may be two different ‘symbolic forms’, but as long as 
their reciprocal connection remains obscure, we will be lead to conceive physics, in 
opposition to Cassirer’s own intentions, rather as a mere aggregate of cognitions than 
as a system. In contradistinction to this, Bohr clearly establishes the specific task of 
classical and quantum physics in our knowledge of the atomic realm. Classical physics 
provides us with the intuitive content for this knowledge, while the principles of quan-
tum physics unifies that content in a description of nature “which may be considered 
as a rational generalization of the causal space-time description of classical physics” 
(1934, 87). 
 By means of this determination of the epistemological role of classical and      
quantum physics, the viewpoint of complementarity opens the road to a transcenden-
tal interpretation of quantum objectivity that establishes the peculiar character of 
quantum objects in contradistinction to classical ones. Such interpretation may be 
sketched as follows. We shall firstly distinguish between the objective validity and the 
objective reality of a concept. The objective validity of a concept consists in the      
necessary character of the synthesis which the concept rules. In this way, a synthesis        
according to an objectively valid concept will be opposed to a contingent association 
of cognitions. In turn, such synthesis may make possible the objective reference of a 
sensible manifold or may bring about systematic unity between already objective cog-
nitions. In the first case, we will say that the synthesis has constitutive validity, while in 
the second case rather regulative validity. 
 In turn, the objective reality of a concept consists in its reference to an empirical 
content. A concept with objective reality is to be opposed to an empty or merely  
formal one. A concept may acquire objective reality directly by means of a schema or 
indirectly, by means of a symbol.20 
 Quantum objectivity is to be distinguished from classical objectivity both regarding 
the objective validity and the objective reality of the concept of an object. Firstly, the 
objective validity of the concept of a classical object rests on its epistemological   
function of constituting the objectivity of a sensible manifold by ruling a synthesis of 
this empirical content. To the contrary, the objective validity of the concept of a  
quantum object consists in its regulative task of bringing about systematic unity 
among complementary phenomena, the objectivity of which is achieved by the use of 
                                                      
20 “If objective reality is accorded to the concept directly (directe) through the intuition that corresponds to 
it, i.e., if the concept is immediately presented, this act is called schematism; but if it cannot be pre-
sented immediately, but only in its consequences (indirecte), it may be called the symbolization of the 
concept” (Kant 2002, 370 [FM, AA 20: 275]).  
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classical concepts for their description.21 Secondly, the concept of a classical object 
acquires objective reality when an empirical multiplicity is subsumed under the con-
cept by means of a schema. In this way, the concept is exhibited directly in intuition. 
To the contrary, the concept of a quantum object acquires objective reality by means 
of an indirect exhibition in intuition, through symbolic analogies.  
 According to Cassirer, critical philosophy establishes that the two essential mo-
ments of knowledge are the demand of objectivity and the demand of systematic unity 
(1923b, 236). Precisely those are the moments which articulate this distinction of clas-
sical and quantum objectivity along Bohrian lines. Classical concepts enable the con-
stitution of empirical data as objective experimental results. For this purpose, classical 
concepts are directly exhibited in intuition. Rather, the concept of a quantum object 
plays a regulative role, guaranteeing the systematic unity of classically described com-
plementary phenomena. These phenomena provide the concept of the quantum ob-
ject with objective reality when they are represented as its symbols. 
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